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ABSTRACT 
Contract farming is emerging as an important form of vertical coordination in the agrifood supply chain in 
India, and its socioeconomic consequences are attracting considerable attention in public policy debates. 
This study is an empirical assessment of the costs and benefits of contract farming in milk using 
information generated through field surveys in the western state of Rajasthan. Contract farming is found 
to be more profitable than independent production. Its major benefits come from a reduction in marketing 
and transaction costs, which are otherwise much higher in the open markets. Contract farming also 
contributes toward improving milk yield and reducing production costs, albeit not significantly. Dairy 
producers also benefit from provision of services and technical advice by integrators/firms who secure 
milk supplies from farmers through contract. The benefits of contract farming vary by scale of operation. 
Economies of scale are also important determinants of competitiveness, in which large farms (both 
contract and independent) have lower per unit cost due to buying of inputs in bulk and greater access to 
markets. Smallholders, on the other hand, derive significant benefits from a reduction in marketing and 
transaction costs due to their participation in contract farming.   
Keywords:  contract farming, smallholder dairying in India, marketing and transaction costs, milk 
supply chain, treatment effects model, mass balance approach  
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1.  INTRODUCTION  
Sustained income growth and urbanization are causing rapid changes in the “food consumption, 
production and marketing” in India. Over the last two decades, there has been a rapid increase in per 
capita consumption of high-value foods like fruits, vegetables, milk, meat, egg and fish, while 
consumption of food grains remained almost unchanged (Kumar et al. 2007). On the supply side, these 
commodities generate higher returns per unit of land and labor compared to food grains (Joshi et al. 
2004). Demand-driven growth in high-value food production is expected to create significant income and 
employment opportunities for producers, especially smallholders (that is; those who own less than 2 
hectares of land) who comprised 58 percent of the rural households in 2003 (Government of India 2006), 
and largely practice staple-based subsistence agriculture to ensure their household food security. 
However, changing dietary patterns towards high-value foods are putting pressure on small farms to 
diversify away from staples and derive gains from market-oriented, high-value agricultural production 
(Pingali et al. 2005).  
Some are apprehensive that small farm diversification toward high-value food commodities may 
come under stress, as the production and marketing requirements of these commodities are different from 
staples. High-value agriculture requires more capital, quality inputs, improved technologies, and 
extension support, and smallholders face problems in accessing these (Key and Runsten, 1999; Eaton and 
Shepherd, 2001). Most high-value food commodities are perishable, and are thus subject to high post-
harvest losses. Such commodities need immediate transportation to the markets or consumption centers; 
others may require cold storage or processing into a less perishable form. Local rural markets for high-
value commodities in India are scarce, and post-harvest infrastructure (such as transportation, storage and 
processing) is inadequate. Furthermore, sales in distant urban markets increase transaction costs (defined 
here as the costs of searching for information as well as travel, transportation, and personnel time). These 
costs are higher for smallholders who often have small, marketable surpluses (Birthal et al. 2005a), sale of 
which in distant markets is costly.  Further, the food quality standards that are becoming more stringent in 
the domestic and world markets, creating a barrier to their participation in markets.   
Vertical coordination of the food supply chain through cooperatives, producers’ associations, and 
contract farming is one of the few alternatives that can facilitate small farms’ diversification by improving 
their access to markets and reducing price risks and transaction costs. Contracts that provide credit, 
technology, inputs, information, extension services, and risk mitigation help producers improve 
production efficiency; develop commercial culture; and augment income and employment (Glover and 
Kusterer, 1990; Key and Runsten, 1999; Holloway et al. 2000; Warning and Key, 2002; Patrick 2004; 
Birthal et al. 2005a; and Ramaswami et al. 2006). 
There is a strong tradition of agricultural cooperatives in India, especially in dairy and sugar 
production. In 2002-03, dairy cooperatives procured over 7 percent of the milk produced, and the sugar 
cooperatives contributed 51 percent to the total sugar production. With increased market liberalization, 
contract farming is emerging as an important form of vertical coordination.
1  
Contract farming is an important mechanism for sharing production and market risks which tend 
to be higher in perishable commodities. For instance, in contract farming of broilers, Ramaswami et al. 
(2006) found integrators/firms assuming most of the market and price risk and helping producers mitigate 
production risks through support services. Sharing of risk and reducing transaction costs thus enables 
contract producers to reap more profits compared to independent producers (Birthal et al. 2005a).
2 The 
potential benefits of contract farming to producers and integrators are summarized in Table A.1 of 
Appendix A.  
                                                      
1 In the context of dairy business, it is notable that entry of the private processors was restricted primarily to protect the dairy 
cooperatives from too much competition.   
2 Transaction costs are associated to the costs incurred in obtaining information relative to the undertaking of the transaction 
(price information, market location, searching potential trading partners). 2 
 
Contract farming is, however, viewed with skepticism. Some argue that contract farming is a 
partnership between unequal players, with the producer being the weaker party; thus, the producer is seen 
as vulnerable to exploitation by the dominant party, the “integrator.” The processing and marketing firms 
may extract monopsonistic rent in the output markets by manipulating terms and conditions to their 
advantage (Little and Watts, 1994; Singh 2002). In addition, contract farming often favors production of 
cash/commercial commodities which require greater investment in specific assets. In light of market 
imperfections, high-asset specificity renders producers poor bargainers (Wilson 1990; Little and Watts, 
1994; Singh 2002). Overemphasis on commercial commodities may also render producers vulnerable to 
food shortages and price fluctuations. Farmers’ excessive dependence on firms for credit may likewise 
lead to a vicious cycle of indebtedness. Moreover, cash crops that require more irrigation water, 
fertilizers, and pesticides may lead to degradation of natural resources (Singh 2002). Another criticism of 
contract farming is that it discriminates against smallholders in order to avoid the costs incurred by 
negotiation, monitoring and enforcement of contracts with a large number of smallholders (Glover and 
Kusterer, 1990; Little and Watts, 1994; Key and Runsten, 1999; Singh 2002).  
Empirical evidence on the true costs and benefits of contract farming in developing countries is 
scarce and largely anecdotal. This study tries to fill this gap: it quantifies the costs and benefits of contract 
farming in milk production in India. The study also attempts to provide an empirical basis for promotion 
of vertical coordination in agricultural commodities in developing countries dominated by small farms. 
Specifically, the study investigates: 
1.  Costs and benefits of contract farming in milk in India; 
2.  Factors which encourage and/or hinder farmers’ participation in contract farming; 
3.  The role of contract farming in improving the efficiency of production and reducing 
marketing and transaction costs;  
4.  Sharing of risks and incentives in contract farming among contract growers and integrators; 
and  
5.  Differences between independent and contract farms at different scales of production 
concerning profits per unit of output earned by farmers, and how management of manure and 
waste disposal affects profitability and the ability to use waste generated from livestock 
operations on one’s own farm. 
The study tests the following hypotheses: 
1.  Contract farming increases smallholders’ income; 
2.  Contracting reduces production and marketing risks;  
3.  Contract farming is more profit-efficient than independent farming at similar levels of scale;  
4.  Profits of contract farms are less sensitive to transaction costs than are independent farms at 
similar scale; and 
5.  Contract farming can be extended to a large group of smallholders in cases where both social 
and financial incentives to smallholder contract producers are advantageous.   
There is little empirical support from existing literatures to either accept or reject these 
hypotheses. The emerging empirical literature shows that, despite being efficient producers, smallholders 
lose in the marketplace because of high transaction costs (Holloway et al. 2000, Delgado et al. 2008, 
Birthal et al. 2005a, Davis 2005). Improving smallholders’ access to market through innovative 
institutions like contract farming is considered essential to enhance their income.  3 
 
2.  VERTICAL COORDINATION IN THE MILK SUPPLY CHAIN  
Institutions such as cooperatives, producers’ organizations, and contract farming emerge in response to 
market failures.
3 Dairy producers are often unable to access market outlets, good quality inputs, improved 
technologies, essential information, and animal health and breeding services.  
The milk market in India is fragmented, having both formal and informal segments (see Figure 
1), but the bulk of milk trade flows through a number of informal supply chains.
4 Producers sell fresh 
milk directly to rural as well as urban consumers. The sale to rural consumers is limited. Direct 
transactions are prominent in urban and peri-urban areas where dairy producers supply milk to urban 
consumers. This practice is more prominent among smallholders. Some large producers from remote rural 
locations also sell supply milk directly to urban consumers. In general, large producers sell milk to sweet 
shops, restaurants, or hotels and/or in the urban milk market (mandi), if at all. Through direct transactions, 
producers are able to retain much of the price paid by consumers, but cost of the search for buyers and 
delivery can be very high. From the buyer’s perspective, there is also uncertainty as to the quality of the 
milk.      
Another important functionary in the milk market is the local milk vendor, who buys milk from 
producers and sells it directly to urban consumers and/or to sweet shops, restaurants or hotels. Sometimes 
the vendors advance credit to producers—mainly smallholders—to ensure a regular supply of milk. Sub-
contracting also exists in informal markets. Some small-scale processors who are unable to invest in milk 
procurement infrastructure obtain milk supplies through contractors who collect milk for them on a 
commission basis. Like vendors, contractors also provide credit to the producers, but they rarely provide 
inputs, services or information to the producers. In the absence of competition, credit-linked supply 
chains are often exploitative of the producers, especially when there is a considerable seasonality in milk 
production. During a flush season, vendors and sub-contractors do not procure the entire marketable 
surplus, and they pay less than the market price.          
Cooperatives and private processors are the two most important players in the formal milk 
market. They use one or another variant of vertical coordination to source raw material requirements. 
Dairy cooperatives, however; are more dominant, and have evolved over time as an important institution 
for dairy development. Most private dairy processors source milk through direct or indirect contracts with 
producers.
5 Both cooperatives and private processors provide inputs and services to the willing producers 
to improve production and quality of milk as well as to mitigate production risks.    
 
 
                                                      
3 Market failure exists when there is asymmetric information between the buyer and the seller regarding the quality of the 
product, product markets might break down all together – presenting a need for coordination through contracting. When 
information on production technology needed for efficient production and optimum quality and the desired characteristics of the 
product do not exist producers find it hard to adjust to the changing demands of consumers, thus providing the need for forms of 
vertical coordination or integration. 
4 The formal segment of the market is defined here as the registered entity recognized by the government, and is governed 
by a set of rules and regulations legally binding the sellers and buyers. The informal segment is also governed by some rules and 
regulations, but there is no assurance that the terms and conditions will be honored by both contracting parties, and the 
enforcement of the terms and conditions largely depends on mutual trust between contracting parties. The formal sector for 
marketing of milk includes cooperatives and private dairy processors, while the informal sector or the so-called “traditional milk 
market sector” consists of vendors and market intermediaries. 
5 The private sector participates in agriculture in a number of ways. The private sector may provide inputs and services, or it 
may buy outputs with or without contracts. In India, private firms practice various types of contracts, including bilateral (whereby 
provision of inputs and services occurs against buying of outputs or by buying of outputs by a single firm); or multilateral 
(whereby different input and service-supplying firms are engaged by the firm buying the output). 4 
 
Figure 1. Milk supply chain in Rajasthan 
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Source:  Adapted from Sharma et al. 2003.5 
 
A number of private players were found to operate in the local milk market in the study area, that 
is, Rajasthan. These include cooperatives, private dairy processors, and vendors. Most of these groups 
were using contracts representative of either market specification, or resource-providing contracts,
6 or a 
combination of the two, depending on the farmers’ requirements. Three main dairy processing companies 
were operating in the study area, namely; GK Industries, Modi Dairy, and Lotus Dairy. Each of these 
followed a common approach to sourcing milk from producers. Dairying was largely concentrated among 
smallholders, and contracting with a large number of small dairy producers was costly for processors 
because of substantial costs in information search, and negotiation and enforcement of the contract. The 
processors therefore did not have much choice but to take milk from small producers. The way they 
addressed this situation was to make agreements with a local villager who acts as an intermediary (that is 
to say, an agent) between the firm and the dairy producers, rather than to make an agreement with 
individual producers. The firm ensures that the agent is an apolitical and non-controversial person, 
capable of motivating producers to supply milk to the firm. This type of arrangement is a variant of a 
marketing specification contract that binds the sellers and buyers to specific conditions of commodity 
exchange (such as quality, price, quantity, payment procedures, sharing of costs and risks, moral hazards, 
and dispute settlement). This type of contractual arrangement is prevalent in Rajasthan, the study area 
and, because dairying is largely concentrated among smallholders, proliferating in India where 
contracting with a large number of small dairy producers is very costly for a private processor because of 
the high transaction costs (in terms of search and negotiation, and enforcement of the contract). The agent 
motivates producers to supply milk to the firm, procures milk, helps the firm in dissemination of 
information, distribution of inputs, and provision of services, and makes payments to the producers.   
The agreement is informal, but specifies terms and conditions with respect to the quantity, quality 
and price of milk; contract duration; mode of payments; sharing of costs and risks; moral hazards; dispute 
settlement and so on. The contract is generally for three years, and can be renewed or reneged with prior 
notice. The agent/producer provides the space for milk collection, and the firm provides necessary 
equipment—such as weighing scales, milk analyzers, milk coolers, and water geysers used for temporary 
storage of milk—at no cost to the agent.  Operational expenses, except the cost of electricity and water 
usage, are borne by the agent. Costs of transportation of milk from the collection center to the firms’ 
processing plant are borne by the firm. The contract agreement also provides for risk-sharing 
mechanisms. Unintentional risks to firm-installed assets (such as machine failure or wear and tear) are 
borne by the firm. Risks arising due to non-compliance of specified quality standards are the 
responsibility of the agent.  
A majority of the contract producers (94 percent) had an informal understanding with the agent to 
supply milk (see Appendix A, Table A.2). They can sell any amount of milk to the firm provided the 
agent is assured of a regular supply and good quality (based on fat and SNF [solids non-fat] content) of 
milk.
7 There was no restriction on quantity by the firm regardless of flush or lean seasons. Each 
producer/supplier was provided with a passbook for recording transactions with respect to quantity, fat 
and SNF content, and payments.  
The agreement was also defined by the commitment of the producer to supply milk at a certain 
time and quality required by the firm through its agent, so the price of milk was determined on the basis 
of fat and SNF contents. In determining the milk price, the firms also considered the prices paid by other 
competitors in the neighborhood.  Payments to the producers were generally made at an interval of 10 to 
15 days. Most producers received payment in full and on time.  
The integrator/processor provided feed, medicines, vaccines, and mineral mixtures to the willing 
producers⎯generally at lower than the market prices⎯because the integrator purchased these inputs in 
bulk. Veterinary services were provided on demand and at nominal rates. The agent provided the inputs 
                                                      
6 Market specification contracts are pre-harvest contracts that bind the sellers and buyers to specific conditions of 
commodity exchange, which include quantity, quality, price and timing. In resource-providing contracts, buyers provide some 
inputs, technology and services to the producers in exchange for a marketing agreement.  
7 In general, processors expect producers to supply unadulterated milk with normal fat content of 3-4 percent in cow’s milk, 
and 6 to 8 percent in buffalo milk.   6 
 
and services, the costs of which were deducted from the milk payments. The advisory services related to 
management of animals were provided free of charge. The integrator/processor monitored the contracts to 
avoid any conflict between the producers and the agent. This monitoring was done by regular visits of 
firms’ representatives to the milk producers to check if they have concerns about the contract farming 
practices, and to monitor and ensure the timely availability of milk. The firm’s representative monitored 
the animals for their yield levels, feed intake, health, and nutrition, including cases of adulteration of milk 
by the producers, if any. In cases of dispute, the producers usually report it to the firm staff, and then the 
staff act as negotiators in order to resolve disputes mutually. 
The milk supply chain is undergoing a transformation in India, from a traditional ad hoc, vendor-
dominated system toward a coordinated supply chain. Initially, the coordinated supply chain emerged in 
the form of cooperatives due to initiatives of the National Dairy Development Board. However, with 
liberalization of the dairy industry in 1991, and the subsequent phasing out of the Milk and Milk Products 
Order (MMPO) in 2002, 
8 the private processors have been entering into the milk market in a big way, 
and they use formal or informal contracts to procure milk from the dairy farmers through their appointed 
agents. The entry of the private processors into the milk market has infused greater economic 
competition, resulting in a disciplining of the informal traders/vendors who hitherto had exploited the 
dairy farmers.    
 
                                                      
8 At present, MMPO puts no restriction on setting up new processing capacity, and does away with milk shed area 
approach,, in which it uses the milk shed as the area of demarcation for firms to secure supplies  . Registration under MMPO is 
now only for enforcing food safety and quality. 7 
 
3.  HOUSEHOLD SURVEY AND ANALYTICAL APPROACH USED 
To examine the impact of contract farming, a household survey was conducted in the western state of 
Rajasthan. Livestock is an important source of livelihood for the rural population in the state, primarily 
because a large part of Rajasthan is characterized as semi-arid and arid, with an annual rainfall of about 
500 millimeters. Irrigation is limited to about one-third of the cultivated area; thus, agriculture is largely 
dependent on rain. 
Dairying in Rajasthan 
Rajasthan is an important milk-producing state in India. With a contribution of over 9 percent to total 
Indian milk production, it is the third largest producer of milk after Uttar Pradesh (18 percent) and Punjab 
(10 percent) (Table 1). Buffalo is an important milch species in Rajasthan, representing a 53 percent share 
of in-milk animals, and a 59 percent share in milk output. Indigenous cows are the second most important 
milch species. The contribution of crossbred cows is negligible.   
Table 1. Dairy stock, milk production and yield in Rajasthan (1993-2004) 
Item  TE* 1993/94  TE2003/04  Percent change 
In-milk dairy animals (‘000)       
    Crossbred cows  24 (0.6)  57 (1.0)  138.8 
    Indigenous cows  1777 (47.6)  2193 (38.7)  23.4 
    Buffaloes  1703 (45.6)  3019 (53.2)  77.3 
    Goats**   230 (4.9)  402 (5.1)  75.0 
    Total  3733  5671  51.9 
Milk production (‘000 tons)       
    Crossbred cows  46 (1.0)  120 (1.5)  161.4 
    Indigenous cows  1792 (37.9)  2238 (28.5)  24.9 
    Buffaloes  2437 (51.6)  4671 (59.4)  91.6 
    Goats  449 (9.5)  837 (10.6)  86.4 
    Total  4724  7867  66.5 
Milk yield (kg/annum)       
    Crossbred cows  1918  2098  9.4 
    Indigenous cows  1008  1021  1.2 
    Buffaloes  1432  1547  8.1 
    Goats**   1957  2084  6.5 
Source:  Derived from GOI data (various issues): Basic Animal Husbandry Statistics. 
Notes: * TE stands for triennium ending 
** Goats are listed in a cow equivalent, whereby 10 goats are assumed equal to one adult cow. 
Figures in parentheses represent a percentage of the total of the specific sub-head. 
Average milk yield of buffaloes and indigenous cows in Rajasthan is comparable to the national 
average, but has not shown any significant improvement. Most of the incremental milk production since 
1993-94 came from increases in the number of animals, which may not be sustainable in the long run. 
Dairying in Rajasthan is likewise dominated by smallholders. In 2003, smallholders comprised 57 
percent of the rural households and controlled 55 percent of the bovine population (that is, cattle and 
buffaloes). Average size of landholding in the state is 2.7 hectares, which is twice the national average of 8 
 
1.4 hectares. However, the low and erratic rainfall renders the majority of the rural population vulnerable 
to income shocks of crop failure. Livestock thus acts as an insurance against crop failure, and helps 
consumption smoothening in periods of scarcity (Figure 2). The proportional contribution of dairying to 
agricultural income shows wide year-to-year fluctuations, but in absolute terms, it has been increasing 
continuously. In 2002-03, dairying contributed 30 percent to the agricultural income in the state. 


































































































































































Source: Compiled from GOI data (various issues): National Accounts Statistics. 
Milk marketing in the state of Rajasthan is largely unorganized. During 2003-04, the state had 
9,643 dairy cooperative societies with about 534,000 dairy producer-members delivering 378,000 tons of 
milk, equivalent to 4.7 percent of the milk produced in the state, but lower than the all India average of 
7.2 percent. Moreover, dairy processing facilities in Rajasthan are inadequate. The state has 27 processing 
plants, 10 of which belong to the private sector. These figures imply that there is considerable scope for 
the private sector to participate in milk markets in the state through institutional arrangements like 
contract farming. 
Data and Survey  
Two districts—Jaipur and Sikar—were purposively selected for the household survey. These districts 
have a high milk production potential as well as a greater scope for commercialization of dairying. Jaipur 
is the state capital and 50 percent of its population is urban. Sikar is an adjoining district supplying 
considerable amount of milk to urban consumers in Jaipur. A number of dairy players, including 
cooperatives, private firms, and vendors, operate in the local milk markets in these districts. In fact, in 
recent years, many private firms have entered the milk markets here. Some important firms include GK 
Dairy Industries, Modi Dairy, and Lotus Dairy. In addition, the Rajasthan Cooperative Dairy Federation 
also has a strong network of cooperatives in these districts.  9 
 
In each selected district, two blocks
9 with a higher degree of commercial dairying were identified 
in consultation with officials of the Department of Animal Husbandry and Dairying. These were Amer 
and Chomu from Jaipur, and Sri Madhopur and Dataramgarh from Sikar. One of the considerations for 
selection was the presence of private dairy processors in these blocks. A random sampling was done to 
select 10 villages from these identified blocks: three villages each in the Chomu (Jaipur) and Sri 
Madhopur (Sikar) blocks, respectively; and two villages each in the Amer (Jaipur) and Dataramgarh 
(Sikar) blocks. 
Before selection of farm households, focus group discussions were organized with the dairy 
producers (both contract and independent) and integrators (milk collection agents and representatives of 
the firms) to understand the nature of dairy production, marketing methods, and market participants. 
Because scale of production is central to this study, one of the aims of the focus group discussions was to 
determine the limits of classification of dairy producers into small, medium, and large producers, ex ante. 
Accordingly, dairy farmers having less than 4 milch animals at the time of survey were classified as 
small; those having 4 to 6 milch animals as medium; and more than 6 milch animals were classified as 
large/commercial farmers.       
In each village, dairy producers who were not members of a dairy cooperative were identified and 
classified as contract and independent producers.
10 A sample of 150 contract producers and 150 
independent producers was randomly drawn, and the sample from each farm size category (small, 
medium and large) was approximately equal (Table 2). Among the independent producers, over 60 
percent of them sell milk to vendors, and the rest sell it to consumers in the nearby urban markets. The 
proportion of independent producers selling milk to vendors is almost similar across farm sizes. 







  Total 
sample 
 Contract    Independent    Contract  Independent  Contract Independent    
Total                  
   Targeted  50 50    50 50    50 50    300 
   Actual  50 50    49 51    51 49    300 
By District                  
   Jaipur  21  32  (15 )*    18  29 (16 )*    26  24 (16 )*    150 
   Sikar  29  18 ( 14)*    31  22 (15 )*    25  25 (17 )*    150 
Source: Compiled from the IFPRI-NCAP Household Survey, 2005. 
Note: * Figures in parentheses represent the number of farmers supplying milk to vendors. 
The survey was conducted in November 2005, and the information was collected from the 
households in pre-tested questionnaires by investigators specifically trained for this survey. The 
information collected includes: household demographics; land and livestock inventory; cropping pattern; 
use of chemical fertilizers and manure, and manure management; nonfarm income; milk production and 
marketed surplus; input use and prices; sources of animal breeding and health services; and transaction 
costs in acquisition of inputs and sale of output, among other data. Contract producers were also asked to 
provide information regarding terms and conditions of the agreement. In addition, milk collection agents 
appointed by the firm were interviewed to understand the processes of vertical coordination and 
associated problems therein. 
                                                      
9 Block is a sub-division of a district.  
10 Farmers selling milk to firms through their designated agents on a regular basis are defined as “contract suppliers.”  They 
may or may not avail themselves of inputs and services from the firms.  Those who sell milk to vendors or directly to consumers 
in towns/cities are termed “independent producers”.  10 
 
There is considerable intra-year variation in milk yield and feeding rates. To capture this, the 
survey should have ideally been undertaken on a regular interval- at least a few times a year. But because 
of time and budgetary constraints, the survey was conducted only once, and generated information on 
production and sale-related activities for the preceding day or week.  
Analytical Approach Used 
Estimation of Production and Transaction Costs, and Net Revenue  
The data generated through field surveys was used to estimate and compare profits for contract and 
independent dairy producers. Costs include expenses incurred on production and marketing of milk as 
well as on acquisition of information, inputs and services. Production costs include expenses on variable 
inputs: feeds and fodder 
11 (such as dry fodder, green fodder and concentrate feeds); feed additives like 
mineral mixtures; as well as medicines, vaccines and human labor (owned and hired labor).  
Information on different inputs used and their prices were obtained from the respondents to 
estimate production costs. Production costs were estimated separately for in-milk cows and buffaloes, and 
were expressed in rupees per unit (liter) of milk output.  Quantities of inputs fed to in-milk animals by a 
household were multiplied by their unit prices and were aggregated to arrive at the total cost of inputs. 
Labor cost was estimated using the agricultural market wage rate in Rajasthan
12 of 70 rupees- 
approximately US$1.5 per day. The total cost was divided by total milk production to arrive at the unit 
cost of production. The information collected on input use and output pertain to the day before the date of 
the interview.  
In estimating transaction costs (such as costs of search, acquisition and processing of information, 
costs of negotiating the terms and conditions of transaction, and the costs of monitoring and enforcement 
of the exchange), we tried to quantify several of the tangible transaction costs incurred by the producers in 
acquisition of information and inputs, and marketing of outputs. These include cash costs of 
communication, transport, hired labor, and the imputed cost of family labour. A few producers, especially 
non-contract producers, occasionally combined other activities with input and output transactions, which 
have resulted in a higher transaction cost than the actual cost associated with these transactions. To 
disentangle the effect of nondairy-related activities, respondents were asked to report time spent in dairy-
related transactions only. Travel and transportation costs incurred in joint transactions were apportioned 
between dairy and nondairy activities based on the volume of different transactions.    
Estimating transaction costs proved quite complex, especially for inputs, as producers procured 
inputs in bulk, especially dry fodder and concentrate. Farmers were asked to provide information on the 
date of last purchase, the quantity purchased, and costs of transportation, travel, and labor time associated 
with acquisition of such inputs. All these costs were aggregated and the cost per unit of an input was 
estimated. The unit cost of acquisition was multiplied by the amount of the particular input fed to in-milk 
animals on that day. The total transaction cost was divided by output produced on that day to get the cost 
per unit of output.  
Transaction costs in disposal of milk were straightforward. The total costs (travel, transportation, 
and labor) incurred in disposal of milk were divided by the amount of milk sold. Adding the unit cost in 
acquisition of inputs and disposal of output provides total transaction costs per unit of output.   
Both production and transaction costs were categorized as pecuniary and nonpecuniary costs. 
Pecuniary costs include all costs of production except the cost of owned personnel time, which was 
categorized as a nonpecuniary cost. The costs incurred by the producer in acquisition of information about 
                                                      
11 Self-produced feed and fodder were priced at prevailing market prices, as reported by the producers. 
12 The cost of the “family labour” was estimated using the existing market wage rate in the region. Use of market wage rates 
often overestimates the true cost of owned labor, especially in developing countries with considerable disguised unemployment. 
Ideally, the opportunity cost of labor should be used in valuation of owned labor. In India, market wages for agricultural workers 
vary widely across states and regions depending on the demand and supply situation; so too does the opportunity cost of labor 
(Gulati and Kelley, 1999). 11 
 
prospective buyers, sources of inputs, services, and prices of inputs and outputs, inputs and services, as 
well as about disposal of milk were considered as transaction costs. These include the cost of travel, 
transportation and personnel time.  
Net revenue was estimated as the difference between the realized sale price and its unit cost of 
production. The unit cost of production and transaction costs, price, and net revenue of contract producers 
were compared with those of independent producers to examine the economic effect of contract farming. 
Correction for Selectivity Bias 
Differences in net revenue of the contract and independent producers need not necessarily be attributed to 
contract farming. This may be caused by differences in unobservable characteristics (like management 
skills) of the two groups of producers. A comparison of average revenue thus could be biased. To correct 
for the bias, a standard treatment effects model was used (Greene 2003). 
  
  i i i i cX bC a R ε + + + =  (1) 
  i i i u Z C + + = 2 1 γ γ  (2) 
where i R is the net revenue of the ith producer,  i C  is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if one 
participates in a contract with a private processor, and 0 if one does not participate in any contractual 
arrangement. Xi is a vector of the variables believed to affect the net revenue and  i ε  is a zero mean 
random variable; while b measures the impact of contracting on net revenue. An ordinary least squares 
estimate of equation (1), is likely to be biased, however; because of the effects of unobservable factors. 
Thus,  i ε  (which contains within it the random unobservable factors) will be correlated with  i C . To 
correct for selectivity bias, equation (2) (logit) is estimated with a contract/independent producer as a 
binary dependent variable ( i C ) and a set of explanatory variables Zi. Variables in Zi will overlap with 
variables in Xi.  Identification requires that there should be at least one variable in Zi that is not in Xi.  
Then, predicted values (also known as the inverse Mills ratio) from equation (2) can be used as an 
instrument (of  i C ) in equation (1).  
Manure Management: The Mass Balance Approach
13  
To examine whether a farmer has the ability to use all of the manure generated on his own farm, the 
farm’s balance of manure nutrients relative to the farm’s potential to use the nutrients through crop 
production was calculated using household survey data. The amount of chemical fertilizer applied per 
land unit was also included to compute the mass balance of nutrients. Land assimilation capacity was 
estimated to determine whether it could assimilate all the nutrients produced on the farm, and then the 
amount of manure sold off-farm, if any, was subtracted It is important to determine to what extent are 
farms internalizing the environmental pollution arising from their production activities, and whether there 
is a difference in manure management between contract farms and independent farms. 
Manure contains nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium which, if not used or disposed of in a safe 
manner, can seep into the water table and cause groundwater pollution. The balance of manure nutrients 
relative to the farm’s potential to use the nutrients through crop production,  
n
h T , was calculated using 
survey data. The amount of chemical fertilizer applied was also included to compute the mass balance of 
nutrients. Land assimilation capacity was estimated to determine whether it could assimilate all the 
nutrients produced on the farm, and then the amount of manure sold off-farm, if any, was subtracted. 
                                                      
13 Methodology on mass balance calculation is mainly drawn from the approach of Delgado et al. (2008). 12 
 
Total nutrient deposition from livestock for each household was estimated using the dung 
evacuation rates of different species by age and sex,
14 where the total nutrient deposited by household h is 
the sum of the nutrient produced by animals of type l in household h. Data on fertilizer use were added to 
the calculations to derive total nutrient use on the farm, using the following formula: 
 
nn n
hl l h h
l
nn
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 (3) 
where: l = animal type ; n = nutrient type; h = household; 
n
h T  = total nutrient n deposited by household; 
AUlh = animals of type l in household h; 
n
h CF  = form of nutrient n applied as commercial fertilizer by 
household h; Mpurch is manure purchased by household, Msold is manure sold off the farm by 
household; and αl
n = the amount of nutrient n produced per animal of type l. 
The capacity of the land to absorb nutrients was estimated based on the existing cropping pattern 
of the sample households and the nutrient uptake rates of different crops. The capacity for each household 
to use the nutrients produced by their livestock was computed as the area planted to crop i by the 





h A U β ∑ =
 (4) 
where: Ai = area  planted to crop i by household h; βi= absorptive capacity for nutrient n per unit of land; 
n
h U = removal of nutrient n  by all crops on the farm.  
Equation (4) provides estimates of the uptake of nutrient n on farm h and equation (3) provides 
estimates of nutrient n deposited through manure and chemical fertilizers. Thus, subtracting (3) from (4) 
provides an estimate of the balance of nutrient n on farm h. This result indicates a household’s potential 
assimilative capacity of nutrients based on the current number of animals and cropping pattern. A positive 
mass balance implies that there is sufficient land to assimilate the nutrients produced, while a negative 
mass balance suggests that there is not enough land to absorb those (Delgado et al. 2008).   
                                                      
14 Dung evacuation rates were taken from Birthal et al. (2005b). 13 
 
4.  FARM CHARACTERISTICS OF CONTRACT AND INDEPENDENT PRODUCERS 
This section compares socioeconomic characteristics of the contract and independent producers, and what 
may have encouraged or discouraged them to participate in contract farming.  
Demographic Characteristics 
The independent producers were relatively younger than the contract producers; however, the difference 
was marginal (see Table 3). Interestingly, smallholders in both cases were younger compared to others. 
They also did not differ much in their educational attainment, with 7 years of formal schooling, on 
average.  
The average family size of contract and independent producers was almost the same⎯about 11 
members per household. The average family size is quite large because of a strong tradition of joint 
families, where married sons along with their spouses and children live with their parents. The family 
composition, too, was almost similar with about half of the family members effectively available to work. 
However, dairy farmers of large farms tend to have a larger family size, and apparently have a workforce 
comprised of more family members than other smaller farms.   
Crop production was the main occupation for both contract and independent producers. However, 
dairying was the main occupation
15 for 33 percent of the contract producers, and 41 percent of the 
independent producers. For the majority of smallholder dairy producers, crop production was also the 
main occupation. On average, dairying contributed 41 percent to the total income of contract producers, 
and 46 percent for independent producers. Crop production, in both categories, accounted for half of the 
total income, and the rest came from nonfarm sources. In contrast, the contribution of dairying was less in 
the case of smallholder dairy producers. 
Ownership of Assets, and Access to Infrastructure and Services 
Land 
The average size of landholding of contract dairy producers was 4.2 hectares, compared to that of 
independent producers at 3.2 hectares (Table 4). Dairying, however, has a high degree of association with 
landholding size. The cross-tabulation on households’ dairy production and ownership of land by scale 
also showed that 44 percent of small dairy producers under contract farming had small landholdings (of 
less than 2.0 hectares). Their proportion however declined with the increase in scale of dairy production. 
Only about 10 percent of the small landholders had a large dairy herd (equal to or more than 6). Among 
independent small dairy producers, 2 percent had no land, and another 68 percent had a landholding size 
of less than 2 hectares. Here, too, the proportion of small landholders having large dairy herd was almost 
the same as in the case of contract producers.  
Dairy Animals 
Table 4 also shows the average herd size of different categories of dairy farms. Average dairy herd (in-
milk and dry) of the contract and independent producers was pretty much the same (approximately 5.4 
dairy animals). In comparing farm size too, there was little difference in the herd size between contract 
and independent producers.  
Buffalo is the main milch species owned by both contract and independent producers. Buffaloes 
comprised 83 percent of the dairy stock of contract farms, and 91 percent of independent farms. 
                                                      
15 “Main occupation” is defined in this context as the occupation contributing more than 50 percent to household income.  14 
 
Table 3. Selected demographic characteristics of contract and independent producers in Rajasthan, 
2005 
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     Crop 
production 
68.0  52.0 54.0  58.0   70.0  48.0  55.1  57.3 
     Dairying  22.0  40.0 38.0  33.3   28.0  50.0  44.8  40.7 






















of crops  
56.5  48.1 49.8  50.6   57.1  47.3  48.7  50.0 
Percent share 
of livestock 
32.  3  44.3 42.7  41.1   38.6  49.8  46.1  45.6 
Source:  IFPRI-NCAP Household Survey, 2005. 
Note:  Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. The numbers marked with the symbols ***, **, and * are statistically 
significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent level of significance, respectively. 15 
 
Table 4. Size of land and livestock holding of dairy producers in Rajasthan, 2005 
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Percentage of small  44.0 28.6 9.8 27.3 68.0 39.2 12.2 40.0
No. of dairy animals/household (in-
milk plus dry)  
          
















































































Source:  IFPRI-NCAP Household Survey, 2005. 
Note:  Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. Figures marked with the symbols ***, **, and * are 
statistically significant at 1.5 and 10 percent level of significance, respectively. 
 
Access to Infrastructure and Services  
Table 5 presents availability of infrastructure and services in the surveyed villages. As the contract and 
independent producers were from the same villages, these facilities were equally accessible to both 
groups. 
Transport facilities are important for exchange of commodities between the rural and urban areas. 
Every surveyed village in both districts was connected by roads. Access to communication services is also 
equally important, as farmers need information on various aspects of production and marketing. Every 
village in the study had telephone facilities. Postal services were available in 40 percent of the villages in 
Jaipur district, and 60 percent of the villages in Sikar district.  16 
 
Table 5. Availability of infrastructure and services in selected villages (percentage of villages) in 
Rajasthan, 2005 
 Jaipur district Sikar district
No. of villages  5  5 
Road connectivity  100  100 
Railway connectivity  0  0 
Telecommunication services  100  100 
Postal services  40  60 
Cooperative credit society 40  60 
Regional rural bank  0  0 
Commercial bank  0  0 
Animal feed/input shop  40  0 
Public veterinary services  20  20 
Private veterinary services  20  80 
Milk collection center  80  100 
Source:  IFPRI-NCAP Household Survey, 2005. 
Institutional credit facilities were not available in most of the villages. With respect to primary 
cooperative credit societies, only 20 percent of the villages in the Jaipur district had these, while 40 
percent of the villages in the Sikar district had them. None of the villages in both districts had a 
commercial or regional rural bank.  
Accessibility to animal health and breeding services was restricted to a few villages. Only 20 
percent of the villages in both districts had government-owned veterinary hospitals/dispensaries. 
However, 80 percent of the villages in Sikar, and 20 percent in Jaipur had private veterinarians. Animal 
feed shops were available only in 40 percent of the villages in Jaipur district. Private milk collection 
centers existed in all the sampled villages in Sikar, and 80 percent of the sampled villages in Jaipur 
district.  
  17 
 
5.  COSTS AND NET REVENUES OF CONTRACT VERSUS INDEPENDENT  
DAIRY FARMS 
Comparison of Averages   
This section assesses the impact of contract farming on milk yield, production costs, transaction costs, 
output prices, and profits.
16 The analysis focuses on buffalo milk, as a majority of the producers did not 
maintain cows. Ownership of buffalo was widespread; over 97 percent of the independent and contract 
producers maintained buffaloes.  
Table 6 provides information on selected parameters for contract and independent producers. 
Average milk yield was slightly higher for contract producers compared to independent producers selling 
to consumers in the open market, which includes wholesale and retail shops, sweet shops, restaurants, fast 
food centers, and hotels.  The milk yield was also high when compared to vendors in the village; these 
vendors are those who assemble milk from different producers and sell milk in the open market.  
The unit cost of production was estimated at 8.6 rupees (Rs) per liter for the contract producers, 
which was not significantly different than that of independent producers.
17 However, independent 
producers selling to vendors incurred higher labor costs. The labor cost to contract producers was 6 
percent less compared to those who sell in the open market, and 12 percent less compared to those who 
sold to vendors. The corresponding difference in feed costs was 5 and 3 percent, respectively.  
Producers incurred costs in acquisition of inputs and disposal of milk. Contract farming has 
reduced these costs significantly. On average, a contract producer incurred transaction costs of 0.8 rupees 
per liter of milk, which was about three times less than that of the independent producers selling in the 
open market, a highly significant difference. The producers selling to vendors also faced much lower 
transaction costs, but slightly more than that faced by contract producers. The independent producers 
selling in the open market faced higher cash costs on travel and transportation, and also spent more labor 
hours in milk marketing. 
Although unit cost of production was almost similar for contract and independent producers, 
transaction costs made milk production more costly for the latter, especially for those selling in the open 
market. The total production and transaction costs per unit of output increased to 11.3 rupees per liter for 
independent sellers in the wet market, to 9.8 rupees per liter for sellers to vendors, and to 9.4 rupees per 
liter for contract producers. Transaction costs were as high as 22 percent of the total cost in the open 
market, and 9 percent under contract farming. Thus, the unit cost of milk production (production and 
transaction) for open market sellers was 21 percent higher compared to contract producers, and 5 percent 
higher compared to those selling to milk vendors.  
Output price was higher in the open market. The average open market price was 12.9 rupees per 
liter, which was about 6 percent higher compared to that offered under contract, and 9 percent more than 
that offered by vendors. This is understandable as integrators and vendors also incurred costs in the 
procurement and transportation of milk. The output price paid by vendors was almost the same as that 
offered by integrators. This implies that the local milk market is competitive, which is largely due to the 
presence of integrators.  
 
                                                      
16 Transaction costs in milk markets were estimated for the amount of milk marketed irrespective of its origin.  
17  A breakdown of cost categories is given in Appendix A, Table A.3. 18 
 
Table 6. Yield, costs, prices and profit in milk production on contract and independent farms in 
Rajasthan, 2005 
  Contract  Independent  Significance of mean difference 
   Open 
market 




Milk yield (l/in-milk animal/day)  9.30 (1.45)  9.00 (1.67)  9.24 (1.47)  NS  NS 
Production costs (Rs/l)           
    Feed  5.82 (1.10)  5.99 (1.03)  5.85 (1.14)  NS  NS 
    Labor
a  2.76 (0.97)  2.87 (0.82)  3.05 (0.95)  NS  ** 
    Total  8.58 (1.65)  8.86 (1.41)  8.90 (1.73)  NS  NS 
Transaction costs (Rs/l)           
    Transport   0.14 (0.11)  0.79 (0.42)  0.12 (0.07)  ***  NS 
    Labor
a  0.67 (0.32)  1.68 (0.73)  0.81 (0.57)  ***  ** 
    Total  0.81 (0.37)  2.47 (0.81)  0.93 (0.55)  ***  NS 
Total costs (Rs/l)           
    Pecuniary  5.96 (1.14)  6.78 (1.04)  5.97 (1.17)  ***  NS 
    Nonpecuniary  3.43 (1.12)  4.55 (1.39)  3.86 (1.24)  ***  ** 
    Total  9.39 (1.82)  11.33 (1.71)  9.83 (2.00)  ***  NS 
Price (Rs/l)  12.16 
(0.67) 
12.93 (0.58)  11.88 
(0.38) 
*** *** 
Net revenue over total cost (Rs/l)  2.77 (2.00)  1.60 (1.78)  2.05 (2.08)  ***  ** 
Net revenue over pecuniary cost 
(Rs/l) 
6.20 (1.28)  6.15 (1.09)  5.91 (1.24)  NS  NS 
Source: IFPRI-NCAP Household Survey, 2005. 
Notes: 
aLabor costs are the implicit cost of family labor. Use of hired labor is almost absent. Figures marked with the symbols 
***, **, and * are statistically significant at 1.5 and 10 percent level of significance, respectively NS stands for “no significant.” 
Net revenue per unit of output, excluding family labor costs, was higher for contract producers (at 
Rs 6.2/liter) compared to independent producers, but not significant. This was almost the same as realized 
by independent producers selling in the open market, but 5 percent more compared to those selling to 
vendors. The difference, however, became significant when the net revenue was estimated over total costs 
(including imputed costs of family labor). Net revenue for contract producers was about twice of that 
realized by independent producers selling in the open market, and about 1.5 times that of those selling to 
vendors.  
In summary, contract farming did not appear to make any significant difference in milk yield and 
cost of production among milk producers, but it helped improve farm profitability by reducing transaction 
costs. The output price under contract farming was lower than the open market price, but the producers 
were compensated by a substantial reduction in transaction costs in terms of profit margins gained from 
selling directly to processors/integrators as opposed to through vendors or other intermediaries. In fact, 
this compensation amounted to much more than the price difference. Another major effect of contract 
farming was that it has induced competition in the rural milk markets, which otherwise were being 
dominated by vendors who often exploited the producers by paying less than the market price. Further, by 
providing some inputs and services, especially compound feed to producers at their doorsteps and at a 
price lower than the market price, the firm could reduce its unit cost of production. 19 
 
Results of the Treatment Effects Model 
Higher profit for contract producers need not necessarily be due to their marketing arrangement with 
processors. There could be a number of unobservable factors (like management skills) that might cause a 
difference in the profits of contract and independent producers; thus, a comparison of average profit of the 
contract and non-contract producers could be biased. This bias has been corrected using the standard 
treatment effects model. 
In the first step of this approach, a logit model was estimated to identify the factors that influence 
a producer’s decision as to whether or not to participate in contract farming. Producers’ experience, 
educational attainment, endowments of land, dairy stock, and access to nonfarm income sources were 
considered to be important factors influencing their decision to participate in contract farming. The 
dependent variable is binary and it takes a value of 1 if a producer participates in contract farming, and is 
otherwise zero. Experience is proxied by age of head of the household, and it is expected that with 
experience, producers would be in a better position to analyze the costs and benefits of alternative 
marketing channels. Education enhances this capacity further. A priori, the effect of education on 
producers’ decision to participate in contract farming is indeterminate. The influence of land on decisions 
about participation is expected to be positive, because of competing uses of labor in crop and dairy 
production. This association is especially true for households with large landholdings, because these 
landholders are involved in mixed farming (crop and dairy). The size of the dairy herd is expected to have 
a negative influence, given that the milk price is higher in the open market, and producers realize cost 
economies of scale in marketing. Households’ access to nonfarm income sources could have a positive 
influence as the labor scarcity may discourage such households to sell in the open market. A dummy 
variable is introduced in the model to capture its effect; it takes a value of 1 if a household has income 
from nonfarm sources; otherwise, it is zero. 
In the second step, a standard treatment effects model was estimated using predicted probabilities 
from the logit model as an instrumental variable, with profit per unit of output as the dependent variable. 
Besides participation in contract farming, it was also expected that education, as well as the ratios of fixed 
capital per animal and labor availability per animal, could be important determinants of farm profits. The 
results of the standard treatment effects model are presented in Table 7. The estimates from the logit 
model (presented in column 2 of Table 7) suggest that the probability of participation in contract farming 
is significantly higher for those who were more experienced at dairy farming. Thus, dairy producers who 
have more experience see the benefits of contract farming over open market arrangements. Educational 
attainment may also positively influence dairy producers’ participation decisions, but not significantly. In 
other words, producers’ experience is more pronounced than their education in its effect on their 
participation decisions.  
Landholding size, as expected, had a positive and significant effect on producers’ decision to 
participate in contract farming. This effect occurred because large landholders were short on labor, and 
easy access to the milk market through contract farming eased the labor constraint. The coefficient of 
dairy stock is negative and statistically significant, and occurred because price in the open market was 
higher and large producers experienced economies of scale in marketing costs. In other words, 
smallholders faced higher transaction costs in the open milk market, but they benefited the most from 
easy access to markets through vertical coordination, which implies that contract farming is not biased 
against smallholders. Access to nonfarm income sources has a positive influence on producers’ decision 
to participate in contract farming but is not significant, probably due to the fact that access to nonfarm 
income sources is limited to a small proportion of the households.  
Columns 3 and 4 in Table 7 shows the result of the profit equations where the dummy for contract 
production is instrumented by the predicted probabilities from the logit equation. In both equations, 
coefficients of the inverse Mills ratio were negative and significant, thereby indicating that correction for 
selectivity bias is important in the model.  20 
 
Table 7. Results of the standard treatment effects model 
 Dependent variable
Explanatory variables  Contract producer =1 
otherwise =0
Net revenue over total 
costs (Rs/litre)
Net revenue over  
pecuniary costs (Rs/litre)
Age of the decision 










Landholding (ha)   0.0686***  
(0.0207) 
- - 





Access to nonfarm 






































Chi-squared 20.11***  -  - 
R-squared -  0.0896  0.0394 
Adjusted R-squared  -  0.0705  0.01928 
F-test -  4.71***  1.94* 
No. of observations  294  294  294 
Source:  IFPRI-NCAP Household Survey, 2005. 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are standard errors. Figures marked with the symbols ***, **, and * are statistically significant at 
1.5 and 10 percent level of significance, respectively. 
The coefficient with contract producers was positive and significant in both equations, confirming 
the observation that participating in milk contract farming was more profitable compared to independent 
production. This result was further supported when Tiongco et al. (2007) estimated the average treatment 
effect of contract farming on the participants using nearest neighbor matching across the variables 
considered. Although not economically important, the average effect was an increase in the net returns of 
contract farms by 0.07 rupees per liter, which is around 3 percent of the actual profit gained by contract 
farms (Tiongco et al. 2007). Moreover, the coefficient of farm assets was positive, suggesting that profits 
can be improved with better management of animals through, for example, provision of better housing 
sheds.  
The coefficient related to labor carried a negative sign but was not significant. It nonetheless 
gives an indication of the overuse of labor in dairy production. However, as expected, education 
contributed significantly toward improving net revenue. The coefficient on the herd size was positive and 21 
 
significant in the equation with profit over total cost as the dependent variable. Nevertheless, this 
suggested that there exist economies of scale in labor use in securing profit per unit of output. The effect 
of the cost of environmental mitigation was negative and significant in the first equation (the dependent 
variable included all costs of production); but not significant in the second (where the dependent variable 
included all costs of production except family labor costs). This implies that having a higher degree of 
environmental mitigation effort per unit of output is associated with having a lower profit per unit of 
output for dairy farmers. 
Despite the evidence that contract farming yields higher profits, not all producers participated in 
it. The main reason for their non-participation was that contract farming was a new concept in the region, 
and a majority of the dairy producers were still in the process of weighing the advantages and 
disadvantages of contract farming. Some important reasons for non-participation in contract farming were 
elicited. Among the most important of these reasons reported in the survey results were under-reporting of 
fat and SNF content by the milk collection agents; the lower price of milk under contract farming; under-
weighing of milk; and the distant location of the milk collection centers (Table 8). These reasons 
appeared to be perceptions based on unsupported information, however; as only one-sixth of the 
independent producers had previously participated in the contract farming scheme. Nevertheless, 47 
percent of the independent producers showed their willingness to participate in contract farming.   
Table 8. Reasons for non-participation in contract farming in Rajasthan, 2005 (as a percent based 
on respondent answers) 
 Producers  selling  to: 
 Vendors  Market  All 
Under-weighing of milk  40.9  36.8  39.3 
Under-reporting of fat and SNF  71.0  54.4  64.7 
Milk at a lower than market price  46.2  52.6  48.7 
Distant location of milk collection center  17.2  28.1  21.3 
Was previously involved in contract farming  11.8  24.6  16.7 
Willing to participate in contract farming  49.5  42.1  46.7 
Total number of sample producers  93  57  150 
Source:  IFPRI-NCAP Household Survey, 2005. 
Smallholder Competitiveness under Contract Farming 
It is evident from the results presented in the previous section that contract farming entails significant 
economic benefits to producers. The question of the distribution of benefits, however, remains. Two 
important questions in this context are:  
1.   Do smallholders participate in contract farming?; and  
2.  Are they competitive in production and marketing?  
In this section, competitiveness of smallholder dairy production under contract farming is 
examined.  
Competitiveness can be defined as the ability of a farm/firm to compete with others in the 
marketplace. It can be measured in terms of productivity, cost, and profitability. Given that every 
producer faces the same market, the one who produces the same quantity at a lower cost can be termed as 
more efficient. In other words, the unit cost of production should be lower for him or her when compared 
to others. However, apart from cost, quality is an important factor in determining competitiveness. It 
influences the output price, which means that profitability is a more relevant measure of competitiveness 
in such a situation. In this study, dairy producers face three different market segments: contract farming, 22 
 
the open market, and vendors. It was noted earlier in this discussion that the milk price did not differ 
much within these segments, but differed significantly across these segments. Transaction costs likewise 
vary significantly across these segments. Thus, the ultimate measure of competitiveness is profitability.  
Table 9 compares the means of key variables of competitiveness for different categories of dairy 
producers. Under contract farming, the average milk yield of small farms was 9.3 liters per animal per 
day, which was as much as that of the large farms. However, smallholders incurred a marginally higher 
cost in production than the medium and large dairy producers.
18 On average, the imputed cost of family 
labor worked out to be 3.1 rupees per liter on small farms compared to Rs 2.7 per liter on medium farms, 
and Rs 2.2 per liter on large farms. The cash costs or pecuniary costs were also slightly higher for 
smallholders. These relationships give an indication that there are economies of scale in costs of dairy 
production and particularly so in labor use. This result is due to two factors: First, some activities such as 
feeding, watering, and supervision were undertaken jointly; thus, the labor requirement did not vary much 
by scale. Second, although the absolute labor use in larger herds was higher, these herds produced more 
and the labor used per unit of output produced/marketed was less.       
Economies of scale are significant in transaction costs. A smallholder incurred Rs 0.9 per liter of 
milk as transaction costs, compared to Rs 0.8 per liter by a dairy farmer of a medium-sized farm, and Rs 
0.7 per liter by a dairy farmer of a large farm. Also, nonpecuniary costs accounted for a sizeable 
proportion of total transaction costs.  
The total cost (production and transaction) per unit of output of small farms was about 18 percent 
more than that of large farms, and 4 percent more than that of medium farms. The difference in pecuniary 
costs was, however; minor, suggesting that smallholder are as competitive in milk production as large 
farm dairy producers, and scaling up of dairying activity would further improve their competitiveness.  
Milk prices were strikingly the same for all categories of contract producers, implying that 
contract farming did not practice price discrimination among producers. Net revenue as compared to the 
total cost was, however, higher for large farm dairy producers. The difference in net revenue as a 
percentage of total cost for large farm dairy producers was 63 percent more than for smallholders and 39 
percent more than medium-sized farm producers. These differences narrowed considerably when profit 
was estimated over pecuniary costs. In other words, economies of scale are important determinants of 
producers’ competitiveness, especially when it comes to use of labor.  
From the smallholders’ perspective, it is more appropriate to compare competitiveness at a 
similar scale between contract and independent producers. This would provide insight into the extent of 
benefits associated with contract farming derived by a particular category of producers. Table 9 shows the 
parameters of competitiveness of independent producers by farm size. 
First, competitiveness based on farm size among contract producers was examined vis-à-vis 
producers selling milk to vendors. Smallholder producers supplying milk to vendors were as efficient in 
terms of production as their counterpart contract producers. Nevertheless, they faced higher transaction 
costs compared to smallholder contract producers. Thus, total costs were lower for smallholder contract 
producers. They got a better output price and thus higher profits. The difference in various parameters of 
competitiveness in the case of small producers was statistically insignificant (see Appendix A, Table 
A.4).  Medium and large contract producers also incurred lower costs of production and lower transaction 
costs. They got only a marginally higher price, but significantly higher profits.  
As compared to open market transactions, contract farming is more beneficial for all categories of 
dairy producers. The major benefits accrue from a reduction in transaction costs. For independent 
producers, transaction costs were estimated to be Rs 2.9 per liter of milk for smallholders, Rs 2.5 per liter 
for medium producers, and Rs 2.0 per liter for large producers. These transaction costs were about three 
times more than their counterpart contract producers, a highly significant difference. The unit cost of 
production for small and medium contract producers was marginally less than their counterparts selling in 
                                                      
18 Although labor use varies with herd size, the difference is not great, as there are a number of activities that can be 
performed simultaneously without much labor requirement. For example, in-milk animals of the same species are in general fed 
together or are taken for grazing and water together. 23 
 
the open market. The difference was more stark in the case of large producers. On the whole, the total 
cost per unit of output to contract producers was less than that for independent market suppliers, with 20 
percent less in the case of small- and medium-sized farm producers, and 30 percent in the case of large 
producers. The independent market suppliers realized better prices compared to the contract price; this did 
not fully compensate for the transaction costs they incurred in marketing. The profit (over total cost) 
under contract farming to all categories of producers under contract farming was much higher than that 
realized by their counterparts in the open market. Smallholder contract producers realized more than 
twice the profits of their counterparts selling in the open market. This ratio declined with the increase in 
scale. In fact, a smallholder contract producer earned more profit than what a large producer realized in 
the open market. The difference in profits of contract and independent producers narrows considerably 
when the opportunity cost of labor is assumed to be zero. Yet the large contract producers stand to gain 
over their counterparts in the open market. At similar scale, differences in most of the parameters between 
the contract and open market of competitiveness are statistically significant (see Appendix A, Table A.4). 
These results show that the benefits of contract farming are skewed toward large producers 
primarily because of the economies of scale in production, a large part of which are due to labor use. 
While assessing the impact of contract farming, Birthal et al. (2005a) also observed significant economies 
of scale in production and marketing. Despite economies of scale, smallholders gained from participation 
in contract farming primarily due to a reduction in transaction costs of marketing, which otherwise would 
have been much higher.  
Table 9. Economics of milk production by farm size under contract farming 
 Contract  Independent 
Cost items 
  



















Production costs (Rs/l)  
    Feed  5.73  5.82  5.44  5.82  5.93  6.3  5.56  6.01  5.99 
    Labor  3.12  2.73  2.17  3.14  2.92  2.41  3.27  3.16  2.75 
    Total   8.85  8.55  7.61  8.96  8.85  8.71  8.83  9.17  8.74 
Transaction costs (Rs/l) 
    Transport  0.16  0.15  0.11  0.95  0.84  0.78  0.11  0.12  0.12 
    Labor  0.75  0.67  0.57  2.00  1.20  1.20  1.04  0.74  0.68 
    Total  0.91  0.82  0.68  2.95  2.04  1.98  1.15  0.86  0.80 
Total cost (Rs/l)             
    Pecuniary   5.89  5.97  5.545  6.77  6.77  7.08  5.67  6.13  6.11 
    Nonpecuniary   3.87  3.4  2.742  5.14  4.12  3.61  4.31  3.9  3.43 
    Total  9.76  9.37  8.29  11.91  10.89  10.69  9.98  10.03  9.54 
Milk Price (Rs/l)  12.12  12.14  12.13  12.88 12.90 12.99  11.84 12.09  12.1 
Net return over pecuniary cost (Rs/l)  6.23  6.17  6.59  6.11  6.13  5.91  6.17  5.96  5.99 
Net return over total cost (Rs/l)  2.36  2.77  3.84  0.97  2.07  2.30  1.86  2.06  2.56 
Yield  (l/in-milk  animal/day)  9.3  9.44 9.16  9.08 9.19 8.73  9.39 9.18  9.2 
No. of observations  47  48  47  16  20  21  35  31  30 
Source: IFPRI-NCAP Household Survey, 2005. 24 
 
Beyond Profits  
A qualitative assessment of impacts based on the producers’ response is discussed in this section of the 
paper. Access to markets and support services is expected to induce farmers to expand their scale of 
production and productivity. Contract farming did not appear to have made any significant effect on herd 
expansion. Only 20 percent of the contract producers indicated that they added to their herd after their 
association with the contract scheme. The effect of contract farming on adoption of technology was not 
encouraging. Only 15 percent of the producers adopted preventive vaccination of their animals to protect 
their herds against diseases. Adoption of other technologies such as urea treatment of fodder was almost 
negligible. 
Nevertheless, the effect of contract farming on milk yield appeared to be positive. More than half 
(54 percent) of the dairy producers reported an increase in herd productivity. Increase in milk yield could 
be due to increased use of inputs and/or management practices. Increase in milk yield at higher cost might 
not be in the interest of producers. This was not supported by the profitability analysis, as the unit cost of 
production was less for contract producers. This was further substantiated by the producers’ response to 
the question regarding the impact of contract farming on the cost of production; 60 percent of the 
producers indicated that they could reduce the cost of production after their association with contract 
farming scheme. The expansion in herd size and increase in its yield had a positive impact on household 
income. Over one-third of the farmers reported an increase in their income.  
These results need to be viewed with caution considering the fact that contract farming in the 
region was only introduced 3 to 4 years ago; thus, the real impact is yet to be realized. Nevertheless, the 
above indicators clearly support the hypothesis that contract farming creates opportunities for farmers to 
invest in livestock and adopt productivity-enhancing practices and technologies by providing an easy 
access to markets.  
For the processors, contract farming is an important tool to ensure an adequate supply of raw 
material of desired quality without investing in acquisition and maintenance of animals. If the firm were 
fully vertically integrated, it would have made substantial investment in land, livestock, machinery, and 
equipment, which would require a very high amount of capital. Further, it would have had to incur 
substantial costs in supervision of hired labor employed for maintenance of assets, including animals. 
Through contract farming, the firm could minimize production risks and minimize supervision or 
monitoring costs. However, the problem of opportunism remains. Producers may tend to be opportunistic 
in case the terms and conditions (formal or informal) are not adhered to, or are not as attractive as offered 
by other competitors, if present in the local milk market. This may affect raw material supply to the 
integrator, resulting in lower capacity usage of the processing plant. This would adversely affect the 
firm’s competitiveness in the market as well. The firm can, however, reduce the problem of opportunism 
by making terms and conditions attractive and monitoring contracts continuously.  
Management of Environmental Externalities in Dairying 
To examine if a farmer has the ability to use all the manure produced on the farm, the nutrient balance is 
estimated based on the mass balance approach presented in Section 3.3. Dairy households were asked 
how they disposed of the manure generated from their dairy operations.    
The dung produced was used largely as manure (Table 10). About 88 percent of contract 
producers and 95 percent of independent producers reported having used dung as fertilizer for field crops. 
Dung is also used as a domestic fuel, but the proportion of households reporting using dung for fuel use 
was limited to 12 percent of contract producers, and 5 percent of independent producers. The market for 
manure was limited; only a small proportion of dairy producers purchased manure from other farmers.  
Dairy producers disposed of dung in open spaces as well as in specially constructed manure pits. 
Nearly 45 percent of contract producers as well as independent producers stored manure in pits. But a 
majority of smallholders disposed of manure in the open. To date, there are no regulations governing 
manure management and no penalty for negative externality in Rajasthan.  25 
 
Table 10. Management of livestock manure (%) 
 Contract    Independent 
 Small  Medium  Large  All    Small  Medium  Large  All 
Use dung as manure  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0    98.0  100.0  98.0  98.7 
Use dung as fuel  20.0  14.3  2.0  12.0    4.0  7.8  2.0  4.7 
Sell manure  0.0  2.0  0.0  0.7    4.0  2.0  2.0  2.7 
Purchase manure  10.0  0.0  0.0  3.3    0.0  2.0  0.0  0.7 
Manure disposal in the open  74.0  59.2  35.3  56.0    68.0  43.1  49.0  53.3 
Manure disposal in pits  26.0  40.8  64.7  44.0    30.0  56.9  51.0  46.0 
Source:  Based on the IFPRI-NCAP Household Survey, 2005. 
As alternative uses of dung were not reported by a majority of the producers, it was assumed that 
all the dung produced on the farm was used as manure. Manure production was estimated using dung 
evacuation rates by Birthal et al. (2005b), and wet dung was converted into a dry matter equivalent.
19 
Nutrients from chemical fertilizers were also added to nutrients derived from manure to arrive at the total 
amount of nutrient incorporated in the soil.  
The total uptake of a nutrient is the potential of crops to remove that nutrient from the soil.
20 
Nutrient uptake is estimated for all the crops grown on the farm. The mass balance is thus equal to the 
nutrient uptake by all the crops minus the nutrient incorporated in the soil in the form of manure and 
inorganic fertilizers.  
Table 11 shows nutrient mass balance for nitrogen (N), phosphorus (P), and potash (K). Uptake 
of all nutrients exceeds the supply in all categories of farms which means that nutrient mass balance is 
positive; farms are not creating a surplus that will cause environmental problems over time. Nutrient mass 
balance is not positive on all farms. The mass balance for nitrogen is negative in 16 percent of the 
sampled farms and for phosphorus in 10 percent of the sampled (see Appendix A, Table A.5). Also, there 
are some farms where mass balance is marginally positive⎯especially for nitrogen⎯leading to a 
possibility that these may reflect a negative mass balance in the years to come, particularly with 
increasing commercialization of agriculture and animal husbandry. Nevertheless, the results indicate that 
in general there is enough land to assimilate nutrients, thus demonstrating a greater scope for 
internalization of the potential negative externalities of dung manure.  
                                                      
19 Dung evacuation rates are as follows: in-milk cattle= 6.9kg; dry cattle= 6.5kg; heifers/calves 5.1kg; in-milk buffalo 8.2kg; 
dry buffalo 7.4kg; adult male cattle= 5.9kg; adult male buffalo=8.1kg; heifers/calves= 5.7kg. One kg of wet dung is equivalent to 
273 gm of dry dung. The dung manure contains 0.6%N, 0.15% P, and 0.45% K.   
20 Nutrient uptake rates were quoted from the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) (2006). 26 
 
Table 11. Nutrient mass balance in different categories of dairy farms (kg/ha) 
 Contract  producers  Independent  producers 
 N  P  K  N  P  K 
Small    
    Uptake  77.4  66.1  98.2  84.5  75.1  113.0 
   Total supply  39.5  18.9 12.7  52.2 21.8  18.4 
    From manure  17.0  4.2  12.7  24.2  6.1  18.2 
Medium  
   Uptake  81.1  62.1  105.6  81.2  69.7  107.1 
   Total supply  35.0  16.6 11.2  35.7 16.8  11.7 
    From manure  14.9  3.9  11.2  15.6  3.9  11.7 
Large  
   Uptake  78.5  44.3  95.1  82.1  69.5  101.9 
   Total supply  23.4  11.1  8.0  24.0  11.0  7.7 
   From manure  10.7  2.7  8.0  10.3  2.6  7.7 
Source:  IFPRI-NCAP Household Survey, 2005. 




6.  CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR SCALING UP OF  
CONTRACT FARMING IN MILK 
Summary and Conclusions  
Contract farming is emerging as an important form of vertical coordination in agrifood markets in India, 
and its economic and social consequences are attracting considerable attention in the food policy debates. 
This study has examined the effects of contract farming in dairying on productivity, production and 
transaction costs, milk prices, and profitability.   
India’s dairy sector is dominated by smallholders, and contracting with a large number of them is 
costly for the processors. The processors do not have much choice but to take milk from smallholder 
producers. The problem of the higher cost of contracting with small producers is overcome by contracting 
with a single person in the village⎯often an agent⎯who acts as an intermediary between the processor 
and producers.  
The study found that contract farming is more profitable than independent production. The main 
benefit came from reducing the transaction costs in disposal of milk. Contract farming also contributed 
toward improving milk yield and reducing production costs. The overall impact, however, was not 
significant. Another major effect of contract farming is that it increased competition in local milk 
markets. The local buyers such as vendors paid almost the same price as those offered under the contract.  
The price of milk in the open market was higher than the contract price. However, higher 
transaction costs in the open market outweighed the price advantage. The milk price (net of transaction 
costs) was higher than both the open market price and the price paid by other buyers in the local market. 
This fact does not mean that because integrators are the dominant party they can extract monopsonistic 
rent in the output market.  
The benefits of contract farming were skewed toward large producers mainly due to economies of 
scale in the use of family labor in production and disposal of milk. At similar scales of production, 
smallholders derived significant benefits from a reduction in transaction costs due to contract farming.  
The issue is one of replication of institutional innovation on a large scale. Until recently, a major 
hurdle in the spread of such institutions was the legal restrictions on direct transactions between producers 
and processors. The Government of India has now opened up agricultural markets for the private sector 
through the Agricultural Produce Marketing Act. Specific to dairy markets, the Milk and Milk Products 
Order (MMPO) has been phased out to allow private industry to establish new processing units and 
expand their processing capacity. Lack of infrastructure remains an important constraint to growth, 
especially in remote areas. Investment in public infrastructure such as roads and transportation will induce 
private sector investment in food processing. The present cold storage capacity is capable of catering to 
only about 10 percent of the total output of perishables.   
At present, contract farming in most Indian states is not supported by legal provisions. Therefore, 
legislation is necessary to ensure that producers are not discriminatory in their practices and that they 
minimize opportunistic behavior and provide an effective means of dispute settlement in contract farming. 
Policy intervention is also needed to ensure that smallholders are not excluded from such innovations.  
Another restraining factor is the multiplicity of food laws. Until August 2006, there were as many 
as 15 laws implemented by different ministries and departments. Such a bureaucracy resulted in filling 
out unnecessary paperwork and delays in getting approval for establishing new food processing units. 
With passage of the Food Safety & Standards Act of 2006, eight food laws were integrated into this Act. 
The main objective of this act is to systematically and scientifically develop the food processing industry 
and shift from a regulatory regime to self-compliance. The Act provides for a single food authority 
comprised of representatives from different ministries related to food safety and standards; the food 
processing industry and consumer organizations; and food technologists and farmers’ organizations.   
To induce investment in food processing, there is also a need to reduce taxes on food products. In 
addition, market fees and other octroi in procurement of raw material and processed foods are levied sales 28 
 
tax and excise duties. Together, these could be as high as 25 percent of the sale price in the case of many 
processed foods (Hindu Business Line 2005).    
Rising demand for food and nonfood processed products is creating the growth of their organized 
retailing. At present, organized retailing comprises about 2 percent of the total retail sales in India, and 
has attracted some domestic business groups into food retailing (Birthal et al. 2005). Some of these retail 
food chains are sourcing raw materials through contract farming. However, foreign direct investment 
(FDI) is not allowed in food retailing in India on the grounds that it would displace a large number of 
small traders and create unemployment. Allowing FDI in food retailing may spur the growth of 
supermarkets, which may help strengthen backward linkages.  
Liberalization of dairy markets is expected to boost dairy sector growth. The question is: Will 
dairying remain a smallholder activity? Increasing commercialization may displace smallholders from the 
marketplace or aid them to scale up their operations to participate in commercial production. In India, the 
average milk production for 63 percent dairy households is ≤1000 liters per annum (Birthal 2007). Only 
15 percent of the households produce more than 2000 liters of milk per annum, and they account for 
about half of the total milk produced in the country. In other words, for a majority of the households, 
dairying is likely to remain subsistence-oriented with little if any surplus for the market unless there are 
market opportunities for them at their doorstep. Nevertheless, smallholders do participate in commercial 
dairying. Birthal (2007) found considerable participation of small landholders in commercial dairying; 
that is, about 65 percent of the households producing 2000 to 5000 liters per annum, and 55 percent 
producing more than 5000 litres of milk per annum were small landholders (those possessing ≤2 
hectares). What this implies is that smallholders are capable of scaling up their production if they can 
overcome some of the production and marketing constraints. 
Potential Effects of the Scaling Up of Contract Farming in Milk 
The scaling up of vertical coordination is likely to have several direct and indirect consequences for 
various stakeholders in the supply chain as well as for the economy as a whole. The effects of the scaling 
up of contract farming will go beyond production, as its multiplier effects in terms of income and 
employment will be significant in secondary and tertiary sectors.  
Increasing commercialization of dairy production will put pressure on the livestock service 
delivery system. Intensification of production is likely to be accompanied by a number of diseases with 
potential risks to animals and public health. Although the public extension system in India is well 
developed in terms of infrastructure and manpower, the delivery of services is inefficient (Ahuja et al. 
2000). To meet the growing demand for livestock services will require either improving the efficiency of 
public institutions or facilitating privatization of the livestock services. However, in view of the scarcity 
of public financial resources, it is envisaged that the private service delivery system, accompanied by 
increasing vertical coordination and, in many instances, the processors/integrators too, will emerge as an 
important source of service providers.  
In the process of commercialization, management of animal waste will draw considerable public 
attention. At present, there is sufficient scope to mitigate negative environmental externalities due to 
animal dung being used as fertilizer for field crops, as manifested by positive nutrient mass balances. The 
nutrient mass balance is likely to remain positive for some time, even if contract farming leads to 
intensification of dairy production. One must be cautious of this generalization, however, because the 
nutrient mass balance depends on intensification of crop production and is location-specific. For instance, 
nutrient mass balance could be positive on the margin or even negative in regions with a high degree of 
crop intensification or in peri-urban areas with a high degree of commercial dairy production. In fact, 
animal waste management is becoming an important issue in urban and peri-urban commercial dairy 
production systems. Yet, to date, there are no regulations governing waste disposal management.     
The global market for dairy products is increasing, but exports from developing countries is 
limited on account of the high level of protection to the dairy sector and stringent quality controls in 
developed countries, with which developing country producers are not yet fully able to comply. India’s 29 
 
presence in the global trade of dairy products is almost negligible, partly because of the above factors and 
partly due to lack of economies of scale in dairy processing. In other words, to be competitive in the 
global market, processors will have to make sizeable investments in food safety and quality control 
measures. Moreover, there is also a need to improve efficiency in processing by investing in technologies 
and improving the scale of its operations.  
Food safety is likewise becoming an important issue in the domestic markets, driven by the 
demand from high-end consumers. It is therefore necessary on the part of the processors and the 
government to orient producers for quality-driven markets. This will require investment in development 
of human resources in terms of increasing producers’ awareness about quality standards, and imparting to 
them the skills needed for quality control measures.  
At present, vertical coordination (like cooperatives as well as private processors) is largely 
concentrated in “favored regions”—that is, those areas with milk production as well as public 
infrastructure like roads and adequate cold chain—primarily because the processors face lower 
transportation costs in these areas. Public investment in rural infrastructure in “less favored regions” is 
necessary to induce processors to work in these areas. Otherwise, imbalances in regional economic 
growth will persist. Evidence suggests that, with the necessary infrastructure in place, vertical 
coordination has been able to promote growth in regions considered to be unfavorable for dairy 
production. Punjab, for example, has agroecological conditions similar to that of this study region, and the 
company Nestle India Limited was able to revolutionize milk production in semi-arid regions of Punjab 
through vertical coordination (Birthal et al. 2005a). The results from this study in Rajasthan also indicate 
that, given adequate infrastructure and an enabling policy environment, vertical coordination has the 
potential to contribute toward improving the performance of dairy production in these otherwise “less 
favored” environments.    
Dairy markets in India have been liberalized to induce private processors to strengthen backward 
linkages with the producers through institutions like contract farming. However, this has not been backed 
up by legal instruments that provide protection to producers as well as to processors against problems like 
moral hazards, wilful defaults, and the like. A proactive role by the government is needed to provide 
adequate legal protection to facilitate sharing of risks and benefits for both contracting parties.      
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APPENDIX:  A: SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES  
 Table A.1. Incentives for contract farming 
 
Risks/hazards in livestock 
Benefits of contract farming to: 
Integrator, buyer, trader  Contract grower (contractor) 
No capital  Access to investment 
opportunities in livestock; 
facilities construction 
Access to capital 
Loss of capital  Incentive to contract grower to 
renew capital 
Protection against systematic loss 
Loss of animal  Protection against careless labor  Protection against diseases 
Quality of animal  Assurance of product   Access to better stock 
Reliability of output price  Reliability of supply  Reliability of outlet 
Quality and price of inputs  Quality gain for integrators and 
cheaper inputs due to economies 
of scale in bulk purchasing  
Quality assurance, availability, 
and/or credit 
Timing/availability of outputs  Ability to meet demand further 
up the supply chain when needed 
Timing and availability of 
management; timely outlet 
Labor supervision  Absence of labor supervision; 
integrators provide technical 
assistance  
Absence of daily supervision 
Land tenure  Access to land without owning  Own or rent land 
Environmental regulation  Avoidance of legal responsibility 
for pollution 
 
Knowledge deficiency  Technical assistance and 
veterinary care provided to 
grower 
Access to extension 
Free-rider risk  Better health control as 
monitoring is strictly 
implemented 
Better health control 
Source:  Derived from Delgado and Tiongco, 2005. 
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Table A.2. General information about the contract between dairy farmers and integrators 










1. Average years in contract  farming  3.6  3.9  4.1  3.9 
2. Any formal/informal contract (% indicating yes)  97.7  87.8  98.0  94.4 
3. Conditions to become contract grower (%):         
        a. Amount of milk   3.1  6.3  10.1  6.9 
        b. Fat and SNF* content 60.9  59.4  47.2  58.4 
        c. Dairy herd  1.6  1.6  5.6  3.2 
        d. Reputation 31.3  31.3  27.0  29.5 
4. Appropriateness of milk price (% indicating yes)   90.0  85.4  56.9  77.2 
5. Restriction on milk supply in flush season (% 
indicating no) 
98.0 100.0  96.1  98.0 
6. Any milk holidays (% no)  95.9  97.9  96.0  96.6 
7. Conditions leading to stoppage of milk supply (% 
indicating yes): 
      
        a. Under-weighing 33.9  41.2  38.9  38.1 
        b. Under-reporting of fat and SNF*  41.9  47.1  33.3  40.6 
        c. Refusal to lift milk  22.6  10.3  13.9  15.4 
        d. Misbehavior  1.6  1.5  13.9  5.9 
8. Dispute resolution (% indicating yes) tactics:         
        a. Reporting to firm staff  56.0  73.5 70.9  66.9 
        b. Resolving mutually 40.0  22.5  21.8  27.9 
        c. Stopping of milk supply  4.0  4.1  7.3  5.2 
9. Frequency of visit by the firm staff (% indicating yes):         
        a. Occasionally 45.9  61.5 41.9  49.6 
        b. On call 24.3  25.6  44.2  31.9 
        c. Weekly  0.0  5.1  0.0  1.7 
10. Monitoring parameters  (% indicating yes):         
        a. Milk yield 10.5  15.6  15.4  14.3 
        b. Animal health 42.1  15.6  23.1  24.7 
        c. Animal nutrition  31.6  6.3  3.9  11.7 
        d. Adulteration   15.9  62.5  57.7  49.4 
11. Timeliness in payment (% indicating yes, i.e., on 
time): 
98.0 95.9  98.0  97.3 
12. Checking of fat and SNF regularly     61.7  81.2  84.3  76.0 
Source: IFPRI-NCAP Household Survey, 2005. 
Note: * SNF stands for “solid non-fat.” 
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Contract   Independent  
Small Medium Large 
Open market  Vendor 
Small Medium Large Small Medium Large 
Production cost 
  Dry fodder  2.12  1.98  1.92  2.25  2.25  2.09  2.2  2.04  2.03 
  Green fodder  0.29  0.44  0.37  0.39  0.46  0.34  0.36  0.42  0.41 
  Grain  1.681  1.645  1.7  1.75  1.801  2.305  1.63  1.9  1.89 
  Cattle feed  1.096  1.02  0.845  0.93  0.996  0.917  0.96  1.05  1.02 
  Oil cake  0.323  0.68  0.557  0.35  0.334  0.622  0.22  0.42  0.52 
  Others  0.22  0.055  0.048  0.15  0.089  0.026  0.19  0.18  0.12 
  Labor  3.12  2.73  2.17  3.14  2.92  2.41  3.27  3.16  2.75 
Transaction cost  
Inputs    
  Transport cost  0.138  0.123  0.084  0.167  0.137  0.149  0.0791  0.0921  0.0967 
  Travel cost  0.025  0.027  0.021  0.032  0.03  0.024  0.0345  0.031  0.024 
  Personnel time cost  0.242  0.292  0.281  0.315  0.211  0.204  0.921  0.651  0.6 
  Total   0.405  0.442  0.386  0.514  0.378  0.377  1.0346  0.7741  0.7207 
Output    
  Transport cost  -  -  -  0.0864  0.121  0.132  -  -  - 
  Travel cost  -  -  -  0.668  0.553  0.479  -  -  - 
  Personnel time cost  0.501  0.379  0.291  1.681  0.989  0.996  0.1155  0.0851  0.0784 
  Total   0.501  0.379  0.291  2.4354  1.663  1.607  0.1155  0.0851  0.0784 
Total cost  9.76  9.37  8.29  11.91  10.89  10.69  9.98  10.03  9.54 
Source:  IFPRI-NCAP Household Survey, 2005. 33 
 
Table A.4. T-values for various firms 
Cost items 
Contract vs. Open Market 
 
Contract vs. Vendors   
 
Small Medium  Large    Small Medium  Large 
Feed -0.31408  -0.36855  -2.94091   0.64075  -0.75758  -2.22047 
Labor -0.09025  -0.69638  -1.31814   -0.73497  -1.9401  -2.91304 
Total A  -0.2618 -0.69287 -2.91745   0.050968  -1.7823 -2.95394 
B. Transaction cost    
Travel  &  transport  -10.3366 -10.1365 -11.7988   1.786182 1.454494 -0.59003 
Labor -9.04217  -4.31008  -5.59886   -2.3697  -0.98265  -1.29362 
Total B  -13.7229 -9.42217 -9.95839    -1.895 -0.52937 -1.35216 
Total cost (A+B)                     
Total pecuniary cost  -2.99952  -2.59414 -5.16734   0.799693 -0.62646  -2.2212 
Total nonpecuniary cost  -4.36104  -2.18863 -3.46262    -1.6673 -1.98385 -2.88684 
Total  -12.6057  -7.7782 -14.4736   -1.46933  -3.7992 -9.56628 
Milk price  -2.30249 -2.07136 -0.06583    0.853994 0.167577  0.113239 
Net return over pecuniary 
cost 0.272844  0.08438  1.58472 
 
0.137505 0.516507 1.522692 
Net return over total cost  3.154987  1.735257  4.014275    1.435099  2.108737  3.965304 
Yield (kg/animal)  0.039761 0.047568 0.088011   -0.02063 0.062065 -0.00993 
Source:  IFPRI-NCAP Household Survey, 2005. 
Note:  T-values above 1.6448 and 2.3263 are significant at 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Table A.5. Distribution of farms according to nutrient mass balance  
Range (kg/ha) N    P K
Negative balance       
    >50  3.7  1.3  0.0 
    40-50  1.3  0.0  0.0 
    30-40  1.0  0.3  0.0 
    20-30  2.7  2.7  0.0 
   10-20  3.7  5.3  0.0 
   0-10  3.3  0.0  0.7 
Positive balance       
   0-10  6.0  5.7  0.7 
   10-20  5.3  12.7  0.3 
   20-30  10.0  19.7  1.0 
   30-40  10.3  11.7  1.7 
   40-50  15.3  5.7  1.7 
   >50  37.3  35.0  94.0 
   Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source:  IFPRI-NCAP Household Survey, 2005. 
Note:  N stands for nitrogen, P stands for phosphorus, and K stands for potash. 34 
 
APPENDIX B:  GROWTH PROSPECTS OF THE DAIRY  
SECTOR AND THE SMALLHOLDERS 
Milk Production 
India is the largest producer of milk in the world. Milk production that had been stagnating around 20 
million tons until 1970 increased to over 86 million tons in the TE—that  is to say, the triennium ending 
average—for
 2003-04 (see Table B.1). In monetary terms, milk is now the largest agricultural activity in 
India, with an 18 percent share of the agricultural output (GOI 2005).  
Dairying is practiced throughout the country, but more prominently in the northern and western 
regions where it accounted for 23 and 21 percent of the agricultural sector output in 2002-03, respectively 
(GOI, 2004). Of total milk production in the country, the northern region contributed 37 percent and the 
western region 31 percent during TE 2005-06.   
Table B.1. Regional patterns of milk production in India (1982-2005) 
Year India  North  West  South  East  Northeast 
  (millions tons)    %  (% share)     
TE 1982-83  31.8  37.0  29.3  19.5  12.2  1.9 
TE 1992-93  53.4  36.8  30.4   19.3  12.0  1.6 
TE 2005-06  92.6  36.8  30.8   20.6  10.5  1.3 
  Annual compound growth (%) 
1980-81 to 1989-90  5.6  5.2  5.7   6.5  6.2  3.6 
1990-91 to 1999-2000  4.4  4.3  4.3   5.6  2.0  2.2 
2000-01 to 2005-06  3.6  3.4  3.0   1.0  6.1  2.7 
Source: GOI. (various issues), Basic Animal Husbandry Statistics. 
Milk production grew significantly over the last two decades. In the 1980s, it increased at an 
annual rate of 5.6 percent. This trend was robust everywhere except in the northeast. It subsequently 
slackened, with annual growth dropping to 4.4 percent during the 1990s, and lowering to 3.6 percent 
between 2000 and 2001, and 2003 and 2004. The decelerating trend of the 1990s prevailed throughout the 
country, except in the eastern and northeastern states.  
Growth in milk production resulted from both an increase in animal numbers as well as increased 
productivity (Birthal and Taneja, 2006). At 1000 kilograms per annum, the productivity of dairy cows in 
India remains low, amounting  to about half of the global average.  
Consumption of Dairy Products 
Annual per capita milk consumption increased from 43 kilograms in 1983 to 59 kilograms in 1993-94; 
and rose to 74 kilograms between 1999 and 2000 (see Table B.2). The rate of increase was highest in the 
1990s.  
The regional pattern of milk consumption corresponded closely to the production pattern. During 
1999-2000, per capita milk consumption was highest in the north, followed by the west, south, and east 
(Table B.2). This pattern did not change over the last 17 years, despite significant interregional 
differences in the annual rate of increase during the 1990s.  35 
 
Table B.2. Average per capita consumption of milk in India (kg/annum) (1982-2000) 
Year India  North*  West  South  East 
1983 43  72  50  31  21 
1993-94 59  103  70  44  29 
1999-2000 74  104  77  51  33 
Source: Derived from Kumar and Birthal (2004). 
Note: * The North does not include the hill states of Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir. 
The increase in milk consumption was not confined to any specific group of consumers, but was 
widespread. Kumar and Birthal (2004) observed that per capita milk consumption was positively 
associated with income; interestingly, proportionate increase in consumption has been highest among 
households at the lower end of the income distribution. Moreover, per capita milk consumption was 
higher for urban consumers than for those from rural areas, but the rural-urban dichotomy in consumption 
was narrowing. These trends imply that demand for milk grows faster with a sustained rise in per capita 
income, especially among the poor.  
The changes in the Indian “food basket” (that is, agribusiness) were driven by a sustained rise in 
per capita income and rapid growth in urban populations. Between 1981 and 2001, per capita income 
grew at about 4 percent a year, and in the urban population it averaged 3 percent a year. Assuming that 
these trends will continue, we expect a substantial increase in demand for dairy products in the near future 
(Delgado et al. 1999, and Rao et al. 2004). 
Trade in Dairy Products    
Until recently, India imported a substantial amount of dairy products. In 1982, dairy products worth 
US$202 million were imported (Figure B.1). This comprised 62 percent of the total livestock sector 
imports (Birthal and Taneja 2006). Most imports were in the form of food aid. However, with sustained 
growth in milk production due to government-supported programs, imports fell sharply during the 1990s.  





































































Source:  FAOSTAT. 36 
 
India’s dairy exports have been increasing, especially since the mid-1990s (Figure B.1). In 1999, 
India exported dairy products worth US$25 million. At the same time, India’s dairy exports portfolio also 
diversified away from traditional products like ghee and dry whole milk toward dry skim milk and casein 
(Birthal and Taneja 2006).   
India has a competitive advantage in milk production but it lacks competitiveness in the world 
market (Table B.3). The producer price of milk in India has remained lower than that of the United States, 
but prices of processed products in India are much higher than the world prices. This difference occurs 
largely on account of inefficiency in processing and distortions in world trade. Another factor is that the 
United States and the European Union provide huge protection to their dairy sectors; the producer subsidy 
in 2002 was equivalent to 46 and 49 percent, respectively (Birthal and Taneja, 2006). A reduction in such 
protection would enable India to have increased access to world markets, especially for skimmed milk 
powder.  
Table B.3. Wholesale prices of livestock products in India, the United States, and the world (in 
US$/ton) (1995-2005) 
 Producer  prices  Product  prices 
Year         Cow milk     Butter  Skimmed milk powder  Whole milk powder 
 India  U.S. India  World  India  World  India  World 
1995  210  285 3155 1800 2136  2045  3335  2051 
1996  208  328 3222 1698 2220  1922  3457  1959 
1997  217  293 3053 1540 2096  1735  3283  1758 
1998  204  342 2820 1715 1941  1444  3039  1701 
1999  205  317 2703 1331 1982  1319  3147  1477 
2000  213  271 2571 1204 1933  1871  3105  1847 
2001  206  331 2548 1293 1882  2043  3047  1976 
2002  203  267 2513 1056 1608  1380  2602  1389 
2003  219  276 2784 1353 1974  1761  3194  1804 
2004  233  355 3107 1788 2387  2018  3864  2020 
2005  245  335 3241 2128 2433  2223  3938  2261 
Source:  Compiled from data from the following: FAOSTAT, www.faostat.org for producer prices; GOI (various years), 
Agricultural prices in India; and FAO, www.fao.org/es/esc/prices. Oceania indicative export prices. 
Markets and Prices  
The rapid growth in milk production was achieved by strengthening vertical linkages between rural 
producers and urban consumers through the network of dairy cooperatives under the umbrella of the 
Indian National Dairy Development Board (NDDB). From 2003 to 2004, India had over 108,000 dairy 
cooperatives, about eight times more than during 1980-81; and the number of individual farmer members 
in dairy cooperatives increased from 1.7 million to 12 million during this period (Table B.4). At the same 
time, there was also a significant increase in milk procured by dairy cooperatives, from less than 1 million 
tons during 1980-81 to 6.4 million tons during 2003-04. In other words, dairy cooperatives procured over 
7 percent of the milk produced in the country during 2003-04. Of the total milk procured, 15 percent was 
processed into value-added products, and the rest was sold as pasteurized liquid milk.  37 
 
Table B.4. Indicators of growth of dairy cooperatives in India (1980-2004) 
  1980-81 1990-91 2003-04 
No. of dairy cooperative societies (DCS)  13,284  63,415  108,574 
Farmer  members  (in  ‘000)  1,747 7,482 11,994 
Members/DCS  118 132 110 
Milk procured (‘000 tons/year)  935  3,541  6,381 
Milk procured (as % of total production)  3.0  6.6  7.2 
Milk  procured/DCS  (tons/year)  70.4 55.8 58.8 
Milk procured/ member (tons/year)  0.54  0.47  0.53 
Milk processed (% of procured milk)    17.1  14.5 
No. of dairy plants    428  748 
   Cooperative    180  232 
   Private    248  516 
 Source: Compiled from data of the National Dairy Development Board (NDDB), 2005. 
Growth in dairy cooperatives happened in a protectionist environment where cooperatives were 
protected from competition through regulatory and fiscal measures. Historically, the entry of the private 
sector in the dairy industry was regulated through licensing, quotas, and zoning. To protect the domestic 
industry from foreign competition, imports were regulated through quantitative restrictions and tariffs. 
However, following the economic reforms program, since 1991 the dairy sector has been deregulated, 
which has resulted in an increase in the number of private dairy processing plants from 248 in 1991, to 
516 during 2003-04. Although there was no verifiable information available on the amount of milk 
procured by the private sector, it is estimated that the private processors procured about 10 to 15 percent 
of the milk output (Birthal and Taneja, 2006). In other words, the informal sector remained dominant in 
the milk markets, producing a share of about 65 to 70 percent in the marketed surplus, which accounts for 
about 50 percent of the output. Informal milk markets were dominated by vendors collecting milk from 
the producers and selling it in the urban markets. 
Demand for milk in India is income-elastic and increasing fast. Informal milk traders expropriate 
benefits from the expanding demand. Individually, producers have small, marketable surpluses and 
depend largely on the vendors for marketing. The seasonality of milk production, coupled with an 
unstable market, offers opportunities to informal milk traders to exploit producers. Producers are more 
vulnerable to exploitation in the states where neither the cooperatives nor the private processing industry 
is strong. For instance, two-thirds of the milk procured by dairy cooperatives come from the states of 
Gujarat, Maharashtra, Karnataka, and Tamil Nadu (Birthal and Taneja 2006). Similarly, three-fourths of 
the private processing facilities are concentrated in the states of Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, Punjab, and 
Haryana (Birthal and Taneja, 2006).     
The wholesale price of milk remained low during the 1990s (as shown in Figure B.2), primarily 
because of increased production. In recent years, milk prices have improved, an outcome stemming from 
a significant decline in output growth. The price of cattle feed fluctuated during these years in a way 
similar to the milk price. Similarly, oil cake prices declined during the 1990s, and then increased in early 
2000. These circumstances indicate a need for producers to find ways to improve animal productivity 
through adoption of cost-effective technologies and better management practices. In addition, there is a 
need to provide producers better access to markets and to strengthen processing infrastructure.  38 
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Source:  GOI, Office of the Economic Advisor, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, New Delhi. www. eaindustry.nic.in. 
Accessed on June 2006. 
Dairying and Smallholders 
Smallholders comprise a large force in India’s agricultural sector: They comprise about 58 percent of the 
rural households (Table B.5). Their average size of landholding is too small to provide them with an 
adequate livelihood in crop production. For such land-scarce households, dairying is an important source 
of livelihood. During 2002-03, smallholders controlled 74 percent of the country’s cattle; 70 percent of all 
buffalo; 77 percent of small ruminants, and 80 percent of the poultry production. They are capable of 
producing at a lower cost given the availability of family labor. Most—more than two-thirds of the labor 
force engaged in dairying—were women (Birthal and Taneja, 2006). Growth in milk production is 
expected to contribute toward improvements in rural income distribution and women’s empowerment. 
Table B.5. Distribution of land and livestock holdings in India, 2003 
 Landless  Small  (<2ha)  Medium (2-4ha)  Large (>4ha)  All 
  % share 
Type of household  31.9 58.4  6.2  3.5  100.0 
Cattle 0.6  73.6  14.7  11.1  100.0 
Buffalo 0.6  70.3  15.4  13.7  100.0 
Sheep and goat  2.1  77.2  9.6  11.1  100.0 
Poultry 4.4  80.1  6.9  8.6  100.0 
  Average size (no. of animals/100 households) 
Cattle   2  131  247  331  104 
Buffalo 1  62  127  204  51 
Sheep and goat   4  85  99  203  64 
Poultry 17  169  136  306  123 
Source:  Compiled from GOI data, 2006. 39 
 
In general, smallholders are efficient in production, but inefficient in marketing because of having 
a small, marketable surplus and poor linkages to markets. Selling in distant urban markets entails high 
transaction costs. Institutional arrangements that improve their access to markets are considered to reduce 
transaction costs and alleviate production constraints. Empirical evidence from India pointing to this 
effect is, however, limited. In a study of contract farming in milk, Birthal et al. (2005a) found that 
contract producers face transaction costs that are 90 percent less than that of independent producers, and 
smallholders benefited the most from contracts. Earlier work by Candler and Kumar (1998) looked at the 
performance of dairy cooperatives in India and found that smallholders likewise benefited the most from 
improved access to markets enabled by the cooperatives. 
To strengthen vertical coordination in agricultural products, the central and state governments 
have taken some important initiatives. The Agricultural Produce Market Committee (APMC) Act that 
restricted commodity transactions within the state-designated markets has been amended to facilitate 
direct transactions between producers and processors. The state governments are also providing fiscal 
incentives to agro-processors who establish backward linkages with farmers. In addition, and as noted 
earlier in this discussion, other factors enabling private investment include the phasing out of the Milk 
and Milk Products Order, and reduced excise duties on processed dairy products and corporate taxes, both 
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